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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE EMERGING cognitive radio technology [1] promises efficient usage of the available radio spectrum. In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), there are two types of spectrum users: (i) primary users who lease portions (channels or bands) of the spectrum directly from the regulator, and (ii) secondary users who lease channels from primaries and can use a channel when it is not in use by the primary. Time is slotted, and in every slot, each primary has unused bandwidth with some probability, which it would like to sell (that is, lease out for the duration of the slot) to secondaries. Now, secondaries buy bandwidth from the primaries that offer it at a low price, which results in price competition among the primaries. If a primary quotes a low price, it will attract buyers, but will earn lower profit per sale. This is a common feature of an oligopoly [19] , in which multiple firms sell a common good to a pool of buyers. Price competition in an oligopoly is naturally modeled using game theory [18] , and has been extensively studied in economics using, for example, the classic Bertrand game [19] and its variants.
However, a CRN has several distinguishing features, which makes the price competition very different from oligopolies encountered in economics. For example, in every slot, each primary may or may not have unused bandwidth available. Also, the number of secondaries will be random and not known a priori as each secondary may be a local spectrum provider or even a user shopping for spectrum in a futuristic scenario, e.g., users at airports, hotspots, etc. Thus, each primary who has unused bandwidth is uncertain about the number of primaries from whom it will face competition as well as the demand for bandwidth; it may only have access to imperfect information such as statistical distributions about either. A low price will result in unnecessarily low revenues in the event that very few other primaries have unused bandwidth or several secondaries are shopping for bandwidth, because even with a higher price the primary's bandwidth would have been bought. Conversely, a high price will result in the primary's bandwidth remaining unsold in the event that a large number of other primaries have unused bandwidth or only a few secondaries are shopping for bandwidth. Also, each secondary has a certain valuation for bandwidth, and it leases out bandwidth from a primary only if the price is less than or equal to its valuation. Further, the valuations of different secondaries may possibly be different and they may be unknown to the primaries. Since whether or not a primary's bandwidth is sold depends on the valuations of the secondaries, primaries must take into account the distributions of the secondaries' valuations while choosing their prices.
Pricing related issues have been extensively studied in the context of wired networks and the Internet; see [10] for an overview. Price competition among spectrum providers in wireless networks has been studied in [11] , [12] , [13] , [15] , [16] , [17] . Specifically, Niyato et. al. analyze price competition among multiple primaries in CRNs [16] , [17] . However, neither uncertain bandwidth availability nor the issue of random and unknown valuations of secondaries is modeled in any of the above papers. Also, most of these papers do not explicitly find a Nash Equilibrium (NE) (exceptions are [12] , [16] ). Our model incorporates uncertain bandwidth availability and the issues of a random number of secondaries and random and unknown valuations of secondaries, which makes the problem challenging; despite this, we are able to explicitly compute a NE. In the economics literature, the Bertrand game [19] and several of its variants [4] , [5] , [6] , [8] , [9] have been used to study price competition. For example, Osborne et al [4] consider price competition in a duopoly, when the capacity of each firm is constrained.
The closest to our work are [8] , [9] , which analyze price competition where each seller may be inactive with some probability, as also our prior work [21] , [22] , [23] in which 0733-8716/12/$31.00 c 2012 IEEE we analyzed price competition in a CRN. However, the results in [8] , [9] are restricted to the case of one buyer, those in [22] to the case of a constant and known number of secondaries and in [22] , [23] and for the most part in [21] , it is assumed that the valuations of all the secondaries are constant and equal and known to the primaries. In [8] , [9] , [21] , the case in which the valuation is a random variable is considered only for the case of a single buyer and under some restrictive assumptions on the distribution function of its valuation. In particular in [21] , it is assumed that the distribution function G(·) is continuous, the function g(x) = (x−c)(1−G(x)) has a unique maximizer v T > c and that the function g(·) is strictly increasing on the interval [c, v T ], where c is the cost incurred by a seller when it sells the good (which, in case of a CRN, is the cost incurred by a primary when it leases out bandwidth in a slot). In [8] , [9] , in addition to the above assumptions, it is also assumed that
In this paper, we consider a CRN with multiple primaries and a random and unknown number of secondaries, in which each primary has unused bandwidth in a slot with some probability. The valuations of the secondaries are random and possibly unequal, and independently drawn from a common distribution. Also, we relax the restrictive assumptions on the common distribution function of the valuations of the secondaries made in [8] , [9] , [21] , and only assume that the distribution function has a finite number of jumps and that the valuations lie in some range [v, v] with probability one, where c < v < v. Note that these assumptions are satisfied by most distribution functions of valuations in practice. The presence of a random and unknown number of secondaries and the relaxation of the assumptions in [8] , [9] , [21] on the distribution function of valuations makes the analysis much more challenging. Also, since prices can take real values, the strategy sets of players are continuous. In addition, the utilities of the primaries are not continuous functions of their actions. Thus, classical results, including those for concave and potential games, do not establish the existence and uniqueness of a Nash Equlibrium (NE) in the resulting game, and there is no standard algorithm for finding a NE. In spite of this, we explicitly compute a NE and show that it is unique in the class of symmetric NE. Our analysis yields several insights, e.g., randomness in the valuations of the secondaries results in significant structural differences in the strategies of the primaries in the NE compared to the case in which the valuations of the secondaries are constants.
In Section II, we describe the model and problem definition, and briefly overview the analysis of the constant valuation case in [21] . Next, for simplicity, we first explicitly compute a symmetric NE and prove its uniqueness in the case where there is only one secondary in Section III and later generalize our results to a random and unknown number of secondaries in Section IV. The structure of the symmetric NE provides several insights, which we discuss in Section V. We provide numerical studies in Section VI and conclude in Section VII.
Due to space constraints, we prove only some of the analytical results in this paper and relegate the complete proofs to our technical report [24] .
II. MODEL, PROBLEM DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND

A. Model
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 primaries and K secondaries in a region. Each primary owns one channel in the region, which corresponds to one unit of bandwidth, and each secondary is a customer who requires one unit of bandwidth. The number of secondaries, K, is a random variable that takes values in the range {0, . . . , k max } for some finite constant k max and has the probability mass function (p.m.f.) P (K = k) = α k . The primaries know the p.m.f. of K, but not its value. To avoid trivialities, we assume that
Time is divided into slots of equal duration. In every slot, each primary does not use its channel, i.e. has unused bandwidth, with probability (w.p.) q ∈ (0, 1). For tractability, we assume that this probability is the same for all the primaries. A primary i who has unused bandwidth in a slot can lease it out to a secondary for the duration of the slot, in return for an access fee of p i . Leasing in a slot incurs a cost of c ≥ 0. This cost may arise, for example, if the secondary uses the primary's infrastructure to access the Internet.
Let v j , j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, denote the valuation of secondary j for one unit of bandwidth-secondary j is willing to buy bandwidth only at a price that is less than or equal to v j . The valuations v 1 , . . . , v K of the secondaries for one unit of bandwidth are independent and identically distributed
Thus, the valuation of each secondary lies in the range [v, v] w.p. 1. Note that in practice, the valuations of secondaries are upper bounded, and hence there always exists some finite upper bound v. The assumption v > c means that a secondary's valuation is always greater than the cost that the primary incurs; so there always exists a price at which trade is profitable to both the primary and the secondary.
In general, secondaries buy bandwidth from the primaries who charge the lowest prices; we will specify the exact rule that we consider for matching primaries with secondaries later in Sections III and IV-A.
B. Game Formulation
We formulate the above price competition among primaries as a game, which is any situation in which multiple individuals called players interact with each other, such that each player's welfare depends on its own action as well as the actions of others [19] . In our model, the primaries are the players, and the action of primary i is the price p i that it chooses 3 . In general, the utility or payoff of a player in a game is a numerical measure of its satisfaction level [19] . In our game, the utility of primary i is defined to be 0 if it has no unused 1 Recall that the distribution function (d.f.) [20] of a random variable (r.v.) X is the function F (x) = P (X ≤ x), x ∈ R, where R is the set of real numbers. 2 For any function f : R → R, let f (a − ) = lim x↑a f (x) and f (a + ) = lim x↓a f (x) denote the left and right hand limits of f (·) at a respectively [2] .
. 3 If primary i has no unused bandwidth, it does not matter what price p i it sets. Yet, for convenience, we speak of p i as being its action.
bandwidth. Let u i (p 1 , . . . , p n ) denote its utility if it has unused bandwidth 4 and primary j sets a price of p j , j = 1, . . . , n. It is defined to be primary i's net revenue. Thus:
Now, a strategy [19] for primary i is a plan for choosing its price p i . We allow each primary i to choose its price randomly from a set of prices using an arbitrary d.f. ψ i (·), which is referred to as the strategy of primary i. The vector (ψ 1 (·), . . . , ψ n (·)) of strategies of the primaries is called a strategy profile [19] . Let
. . , ψ n (·)) denote the vector of strategies of primaries other than i. Let E{u i (ψ i (·), ψ −i )} denote the expected utility of primary i when it adopts strategy ψ i (·) and the other primaries adopt ψ −i .
We use the Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution concept, which has been extensively used in game theory in general and wireless network applications in particular as a prediction of the outcome of a game. Several arguments have been proposed in the literature for using NE as a solution concept, e.g. it is a necessary condition if there is a unique predicted outcome to a game, a strategy profile can be a "focal point" only if it is a NE etc. (see Section 8.D in [19] for a detailed discussion). A NE is a strategy profile such that no player can improve its expected utility by unilaterally deviating from its strategy [19] .
When players other than i play ψ * −i , ψ * i (·) maximizes i's expected utility and is thus its best-response [19] to ψ * −i .
C. Symmetric NE
Since the bandwidth availability probability of each primary is the same (equal to q), the game in Section II-A is a symmetric game, which is one in which all players have the same parameters, action sets and utility functions.
We focus on a specific class of NE, known as symmetric NE.
In practice it is challenging to implement any other NE-the simple example of two primaries and a NE of (ψ *
, then since players have the same action sets, utility functions and probability of having unused bandwidth (i.e., the game is a symmetric game), (ψ * 2 (·), ψ * 1 (·)) also constitutes a NE. If player 1 knows that player 2 is playing ψ * 2 (·) (ψ * 1 (·) respectively), it would choose the best response ψ * 1 (·) (ψ * 2 (·) respectively), but it cannot know player 2's choice between the two options without explicitly coordinating with it, which is again ruled out due to the competition between the two. Under symmetric NE, all players play the same strategy, and thus this quandary is somewhat limited-symmetric NE has indeed been advocated for symmetric games by several game theorists [3] . The natural question now is whether there exists at least one symmetric NE, and also whether there is a unique symmetric NE (only uniqueness will eliminate the above quandary). Note that some symmetric games are known to have multiple symmetric NE. For example, consider the simple "Meeting in New York game" [19] with two players, where each player can either be at Grand Central or at Empire State Building, and both receive unit utility if they meet and zero utility otherwise. The strategies where each player is at Grand Central, and where each player is at Empire State Building, both constitute symmetric NE. Our goal is to explicitly compute a symmetric NE and to show its uniqueness in our context.
D. Symmetric NE in the Constant Valuation Case
In our prior work [21] , we analyzed price competition among multiple primaries when the valuation of each secondary is the same and equals a constant v > c that is known to the primaries (the model in [21] is otherwise as in the present paper). In this subsection, we briefly summarize the structure of the symmetric NE that we computed for the constant v model in [21] ; later, in Section V, we will contrast it with the symmetric NE that we will find for the model in the present paper.
It is easy to check that w(q, n) is the probability that K or more out of n−1 primaries have unused bandwidth. Also, letp = v−w(q, n)(v−c). In [21] , we showed that in the constant valuation model, there is a unique symmetric NE; in this NE, each primary selects prices only in the range [p, v] . Also, it randomizes over the prices in [p, v] using a continuous d.f. ψ(·), which is strictly increasing on [p, v] and has been explicitly computed (see Theorem 2 and Remark 1 in [21] ). Note that the symmetric NE price selection strategy ψ(·) is contiguous in the sense that it selects prices only in the interval [p, v] , and every sub-interval of this interval is selected with positive probability.
E. Pseudo-price
For convenience, we introduce the notion of a "pseudoprice". The pseudo-price of primary i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, denoted as p i , is defined as follows 6 :
Now, recall that a price p i < c incurs a loss for primary i. Also, no secondary buys bandwidth at a price p i > v. So a primary i who has unused bandwidth always sets its price p i in the range [c, v] .
for a primary i iff it has unused bandwidth and sets a price 
III. ONE SECONDARY
In this section, for simplicity, we find a symmetric NE and prove its uniqueness for the case in which there is only one secondary, i.e. K = 1 w.p. 1. This secondary buys bandwidth from the primary who quotes the lowest pseudoprice, provided this price is less than or equal to its valuation. In Section IV, we generalize our results to allow for multiple and a random number of secondaries.
In Section III-A, we will explicitly compute a symmetric NE and in Section III-B show that it is the unique symmetric NE.
A. Explicit Computation of Symmetric NE
Consider a symmetric NE under which every primary uses the price selection strategy ψ(·), and let φ(·) be the corresponding pseudo-price selection strategy. In this subsection, we describe the structure of ψ(·) (and φ(·)), and in Theorem 1 show that it indeed constitutes a symmetric NE strategy. First, the following lemma provides a necessary condition that ψ(·) must satisfy.
Lemma 1: ψ(·) is continuous.
Proof: Suppose, to reach a contradiction, that ψ(·) has a jump at x 0 . Hence, x 0 is a best response for each primary under the symmetric NE. Fix an i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since the secondary selects the primary who quotes the lowest price, and every primary in {1, . . . , n}\i has a jump at x 0 , for primary i, a price just below x 0 fetches a higher expected payoff than x 0 . So x 0 is not a best response for primary i, which is a contradiction. The result follows.
Recall that a pure-strategy NE [18] is one in which every player (primary) selects a single action (price) w.p. 1. Lemma 1 shows that there does not exist a pure strategy symmetric NE in the present context.
Let f x (y) be primary i's expected payoff if it sets the pseudo-price p i = x, and
Note that when (2) holds, y ∈ [0, q] is a measure of the amount of competition that primary i faces from the other primaries. The two extreme values y = q (maximum competition) and y = 0 (no competition) occur frequently in the rest of the paper and hence we introduce separate notation for primary i's expected payoffs in these cases. Let:
The following two lemmas provide an expression for f x (y) and state some of its properties:
Lemma 2:
Thus, g(·) and h(·) are left-continuous and g(x
is a strictly increasing function of x for every fixed y. Also, f c (y) = 0 for every fixed y.
Using (3), part 1 of Lemma 3 and the fact that G(·) has a finite number of jumps, it can be shown that h(·) has a maximizer on the set [c, v] . Let h max = max v∈ [c,v] h(v) be the maximum value of h(·) and
be the infimum of the set of maximizers of h(·). 
By definition of f x (y) and by (3), if no primary in {1, . . . , n}\i plays a pseudo-price below x (i.e., if P (p j ≤ x) = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}\i), then primary i gets an (expected) payoff of g(·) at pseudo-price x. We will later show that primaries do not play prices belowp under the strategy ψ(·), andp is a best response for every primary in the corresponding NE. So the payoff that every primary gets at a best response in the NE equals g(p).
It is easy to check that a primary's payoff at a pseudo-price in 
is left continuous by part 1 of Lemma 3, and therefore such points can only be in the right neighborhood of x. The existence of such points imply that g(·) is not continuous at x. Thus, g(x + ) < g(x) and g(·) < g(x) < g(p) in the right neighborhood of x. The resulting contradiction establishes that C is closed. So C is the union of a set of disjoint closed intervals-let C = ∪ i∈λ C i , where λ is some set of indices and 
where C is as in (6) .
Also,
By definition of the function f x (y) and by (7), for every
, which is the symmetric NE best response payoff. Since P {p j ≤ x} = φ(x) ∀j in the symmetric NE, this suggests γ(·) (suitably extended to the region x / ∈ C) as a candidate for the symmetric NE pseudo-price selection strategy d.f. φ(·). But γ(x) itself need not be a valid d.f. since it is not non-decreasing in general as shown in Fig. 1 . So a natural idea is to consider the function 9 :
obtained by replacing the portions where γ(x) is smaller than γ(y) for some y < x (and y ∈ C) by horizontal segments as illustrated in Fig. 1 
Also, since γ(p) = 0 and γ(v T ) = q (see Lemma 6) , and by (8) and (9):
9 Recall from the definition of a pseudo-price that a pseudo-price selection strategy d.f. has a jump of size 1 − q at v + 1.
Combining (8) and (10), we get:
is non-decreasing and right-continuous [20] and has a jump of size 1 − q at v + 1, and hence is a valid pseudoprice d.f.
Theorem 1: The strategy profile in which each primary uses the pseudo-price selection strategy φ(·) = φ NE (·) is a NE.
Proof: Suppose every primary uses the strategy φ NE (·) to select its pseudo-price. By definition of f x (y), if primary i sets a pseudo-price of p i = x, it gets an expected payoff of:
By (11),
Then by (12) :
≤ f x (0) (by Lemma 4 and (9)) (6)) (13) Case (ii): Suppose x ∈ C and φ NE (x) = γ(x). Then by (12) and (7),
Case (iii): Now, suppose x ∈ C and φ NE (x) > γ(x). Then by (12) , Lemma 4 and (7):
Also, x is part of an interval of constancy of φ NE (x); so primaries play pseudo-prices around x with zero probability. Case (iv): Suppose x <p. Then by (10) , φ NE (x) = 0. So by (12) ,
So by (12) ,
Now, since φ NE (·) is non-decreasing and continuous on [c, v] , it has alternating intervals of constancy and strict increase. Also, note that a primary who uses the d.f. φ NE (·) to select its pseudo-price plays pseudo-prices in the intervals of constancy with zero probability and in the intervals of strict increase with positive probability. Now, by (10) , the intervals [c,p] and [v T , v] (Cases (iv) and (v) respectively) are intervals of constancy of φ NE (·). Also, it can be checked using (11) that the intervals which lie in the regions [p, v T ]\C and {x ∈ C : φ NE (x) > γ(x)} (Cases (i) and (iii) respectively) are also regions of constancy. Thus, only intervals that lie in the region {x ∈ C : φ NE (x) = γ(x)} (Case (ii)) can possibly be intervals of strict increase of φ NE (·).
By
at any pseudo-price. Also, as shown in the previous paragraph, it can only play intervals in the region {x ∈ C : φ NE (x) = γ(x)} (Case (ii)) with positive probability. Its expected payoff is g(p), the maximum possible, at a pseudo-price in this region by Case (ii). Hence φ NE (·) is a best response for primary i. The result follows.
Note that in the proof of Theorem 1, we have shown the following:
Lemma 7: In the symmetric NE in which every primary uses the strategy φ NE (·), each primary gets an expected payoff of g(p).
B. Uniqueness of Symmetric NE
Now, we show that the NE in Theorem 1 is the unique symmetric NE. Let the functions f x (y), h(·) and g(·), γ(·) and φ NE (·) be as in (4), (3), Lemma 6 and (11) respectively. Also, let v T ,p and the set C be as in (5) 
Lemma 8: v T = v T . Also, v T is a best response for each primary in the symmetric NE. Thus, the upper endpoint of the support set ofψ(·) is v T .
Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 1,ψ(·) is continuous. Also, note that by (19) , each primary plays prices in [v T − , v T ] with positive probability for every > 0. Hence, v T is a best response for each primary i.
To reach a contradiction, suppose v T > v T . Then by (19), ψ(v T ) < 1 and henceφ
Similar to the derivation of (12): (20) and Lemma 4)
where (22) follows from (21) similar to the derivation of (16).
Similar to the derivation of (16):
which is again a contradiction. Thus, v T < v T is not possible and hence v T = v T . Now we are ready to prove the uniqueness of the symmetric NE strategy φ NE (·) in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: φ NE (·) constitutes the unique symmetric NE strategy.
Proof: Consider a symmetric NE in which every primary uses the price (respectively, pseudo-price) selection strategŷ ψ(·) (respectively,φ NE (·)). We will show thatφ NE (·) = φ NE (·).
As in the proof of Lemma 1,ψ(·) is continuous. Also, by Lemma 8, v T is the upper endpoint of the support set ofψ(·) and is a best response for each primary i in the symmetric NE. By definition of f x (y), the payoff that each primary i gets at pseudo-price x in the NE is:
Also, similar to the derivation of (16), the payoff that each primary i gets at pseudo-price v T is:
where the second equality follows from Lemma 5. Since v T is a best response, each primary gets an expected payoff of g(p) in the NE. Now, for a pseudo-price x <p, by (23), primary i gets a payoff of:
where (26) follows from (25) similar to the derivation of (15). Thus, primaries do not play prices belowp in the NE and henceφ NE (p) = 0. Similar to the derivation of (13), it can be shown that for
and hence x is not a best response. Thus, only pseudo-prices in C can possibly be best responses.
If x 0 is a best response for primary i, then by (23):
By (27) and Lemma 6: 
(29) where the equality follows by (11) . Now, let [a c , b c ] be a maximal interval of constancy of φ NE (·) such thatφ NE (a c ) > 0. Note that a c is the right endpoint of an interval of strict increase 10 . So a c is a best response and henceφ NE (a c ) = γ(a c ) by (28). So for all
(30) where the equality follows by (11) .
By (29) and (30):
It remains to show thatφ
Then for all x < x l ,φ NE (x) = φ NE (x). So by continuity ofφ NE (·) and φ NE (·),φ NE (x l ) = φ NE (x l ). Also, by (32), there exists an x 0 = x l + , for some small > 0, such that:
and [x l , x 0 ] is an interval of strict increase of φ NE (·). In particular, x 0 is a best response of primary i when the other primaries use φ NE (·). Now, by (23), the expected payoff of primary i for pseudoprice p i = x 0 when other primaries playφ NE (·) is:
where (34) follows from the fact that x 0 is a best response of primary i when the other primaries use φ NE (·) and Lemma 7. This contradicts the fact that the maximum payoff that primary i can get when the other primaries useφ NE (·) is g(p). Thus,
By (31) and (35),φ NE (x) = φ NE (x) ∀x ∈ [c, v] and the result follows.
IV. RANDOM NUMBER OF SECONDARIES
In Section III, we explicitly computed the symmetric NE and showed its uniqueness for the case of one secondary. We now generalize our results to the model described in Section II-A, in which there are a random number, K, of secondaries.
A. Primary Secondary Matching Scheme
Note that for a given number of secondaries, valuations of the secondaries and prices quoted by the primaries, there are in general different possible schemes for matching primaries with the secondaries who buy bandwidth from them. Consider a scenario in which there are k secondaries, where k is a constant. Let p (1) ≤ p (2) ≤ . . . ≤ p (n) be the pseudo-prices p 1 , . . . , p n of the primaries in increasing order. Also, let v
be the valuations of the secondaries in decreasing order.
Let A be the set of all possible schemes of matching primaries with secondaries such that bandwidth is never bought from a primary if the bandwidth of a different primary who offers a lower pseudo-price remains unsold. Note that under every scheme in A, the bandwidth of the primaries with the smallest i pseudo-prices p (1) , . . . , p (i) is sold, for some i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, and the bandwidth of the rest of the primaries is not sold. Let W be the scheme in which the secondary with the highest valuation v (1) buys from the primary with the lowest pseudo-price p (1) (if p (1) ≤ v (1) ), the secondary with the second-highest valuation v (2) buys from the primary with the second-lowest pseudo-price p (2) (if p (2) ≤ v (2) ) and so on. (Ties are broken at random.) In order to contrast with W , consider another scheme B, in which the primary with the lowest pseudo-price p (1) sells to the secondary with the lowest valuation that is greater than or equal to p (1) , the primary with the second lowest pseudo-price p (2) sells to the secondary, among the rest of the secondaries, with the lowest valuation that is greater than or equal to p (2) and so on. Note that both W and B are in A. For example, suppose n = 4, k = 3, the pseudo-prices of the primaries in increasing order are p (1) = 1, p (2) = 2, p (3) = 3, p (4) = 4 and the valuations of the secondaries in decreasing order are
The tables in Table I show the valuation of the secondary who buys bandwidth from each primary for the schemes W and B. The tables show that the scheme B is more "efficient" than the scheme W in the sense that more primaries sell their bandwidth. In fact, the following lemma shows that in this sense the scheme W is the worstcase or least efficient scheme in A.
Lemma 9: 1) For any given set of pseudo-prices of the primaries and valuations of the secondaries, out of all the schemes in A, the bandwidth of the least number of primaries is sold under the scheme W . 2) Out of all the schemes in A and for any given set of pseudo-price distributions of the primaries and distributions of the valuations of the secondaries, given that a primary i has unused bandwidth and sets price p i = x, the probability that its bandwidth is sold, and hence its expected payoff, is minimized for the scheme W . Proof: Clearly, the second part is an immediate consequence of the first part. We therefore prove only the first part here. Towards that end, consider a given set of pseudo-prices: p (1) , . . . , p (n) and v (1) , . . . , v (k) . Suppose, under the scheme W , the bandwidth of the primaries with pseudo-prices p (1) , . . . , p (i) is sold. By definition of W , these i primaries sell their bandwidth to the secondaries with the i largest valuations v (1) , . . . , v (i) and the primary with pseudo-price p (i) sells to the secondary with the smallest valuation v (i) out of these. Thus, v (i) ≥ p (i) and hence:
Now, consider an arbitrary scheme A ∈ A, and suppose, to reach a contradiction, that under A, only the bandwidth of the primaries with pseudo-prices p (1) , . . . , p (i ) is sold for some i < i. Hence, at most i out of the secondaries with valuations v (1) , . . . , v (i) buy bandwidth under A and hence at least one of these secondaries does not buy bandwidth. However, by (36), the valuation of such a secondary is greater than or equal to the pseudo-price p (i +1) , which contradicts the fact that the bandwidth of the primary with pseudo-price p (i +1) remains unsold. This shows that the bandwidth of the least number of primaries is sold under the scheme W .
We assume that primaries do not know the scheme that will be used to match the primaries and secondaries, and hence, each primary, so as to maximize its worst-case payoff, selects its price distribution assuming that the scheme W will be used. Note that, by Lemma 9, for any scheme A ∈ A that is actually used to match the primaries and secondaries, each primary is assured an expected payoff that is at least as much as the expected payoff that it would have got had the scheme W been used. Also note that the scheme W has been used to match the buyers and sellers in a marketplace in [14] .
B. Analysis
We now generalize the analysis in Section III to a random number, K, of secondaries. First, it is easy to see that Lemma 1 readily generalizes to the case of a random number of secondaries. Now, recall from Section II-A that the valuations of the secondaries are i.i. [7] . The following lemma provides some simple properties of the functions G 
Let f x (y) be as defined just before (2) in Section III and h(·) and g(·) be as in (3) . In Lemma 2, we derived an expression for f x (y) for the case of one secondary. The following lemma generalizes that expression to K secondaries when the scheme W is used.
Lemma 11:
where 11 ,
Proof: Let f x,k (y) be the value of f x (y) conditioned on the event K = k; then clearly f x (y) is given by (40). We now 11 Recall that for integers a,
show (41). Let K = k. Let Z be the number of primaries out of primaries {1, . . . , n}\i for which the pseudo-price p j ≤ x. By (2), the events {p j ≤ x}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}\i are independent Bernoulli events with success probability y each. So:
Also, under the scheme W , if Z = i − 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then primary i's bandwidth is sold iff 12 i or more secondaries have valuations ≥ x; the probability of the latter event is:
If Z ≥ k, then primary i's bandwidth is not sold. Conditioning on Z and using (42) and (43), we get that the probability that primary i's bandwidth is sold given that it sets a price p i = x equals the summation in (41). This, combined with the fact that if primary i's bandwidth is sold at price p i = x, then it gets a payoff of x − c, gives (41). Let v T be defined as in (5) . The following lemma generalizes the properties of f x (y) that were shown for the case of one secondary.
Lemma 12: The properties of f x (y) in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 hold for the case of K secondaries. Now, the analysis in Section III after Lemma 4 does not use the expression for f x (y) and relies only on the properties of f x (y) in Lemmas 3 and 4. Since these properties go through for the case of K secondaries by Lemma 12, the analysis in Section III after Lemma 4 generalizes to the case of K secondaries. In particular, we definep, C, the function γ(·) and the function φ NE (·) as in Lemma 5, (6), Lemma 6 and (8) respectively. Theorems 1 and 2 generalize to the case of K secondaries and provide the unique symmetric NE strategy.
V. DISCUSSION
As noted after Lemma 1, there does not exist a pure-strategy symmetric NE in the game in this paper. This is similar to the case in which the valuations of all the secondaries are constant and equal (see Section II-D), where there is a unique symmetric NE that is of mixed-strategy type.
As explained in Section II-D, when the valuations of all the secondaries are constant and equal, the symmetric NE price selection strategy is contiguous. Thus, every price in the interval [p, v] fetches the maximum expected payoff. However, we now show by providing an example that when the valuations of the secondaries are random, the symmetric NE price selection strategy can be non-contiguous, even when there is only one secondary, i.e., K = 1. Thus, there may exist one or more intervals within [p, v T ] in which primary i gets a sub-optimal expected payoff.
Let n = 2, c = 0, v = 1, v = 3, q = 
By (3), (4) and using the facts that K = 1 and c = 0, we get
is plotted in Fig. 2 . g(x) (see (4) and (3)).
Also, it can be checked thatp = Note that G(·) in (44) is non-contiguous. However, the symmetric NE price-selection strategy can be non-contiguous even when the d.f. of the secondary's valuation is contiguous. For instance, consider the above example with G(·) in (44) replaced with the following contiguous function 13 :
For small enough, say = 0.01, the corresponding symmetric NE price-selection strategy is non-contiguous (see Fig. 3 ). Intuitively, when the valuations of the secondaries are random, in the absence of competition from the other primaries, a primary faces the following tradeoff while selecting its price: a high price increases its revenue if its bandwidth is bought, but also increases the probability that the price exceeds the valuation(s) of one or more secondaries and hence decreases the probability that the primary's bandwidth is bought. But in the constant valuation case, in the absence of competition from the other primaries, increasing the price (up to the common valuation v) strictly increases a primary's expected payoff. This is the intuition behind the fact that the symmetric NE strategies in the random valuations case can be noncontiguous, but not in the constant valuation case. 13 Note that G(·) in (45) reduces to that in (44) when = 0. g(x) (see (4) and (3)).
VI. NUMERICAL STUDIES
First, we study via numerical computations, the dependence of the structure of the symmetric NE strategy and the mean price of bandwidth charged by each primary under the symmetric NE on different parameters. Throughout this section, we consider a scenario in which the valuation of each secondary is uniformly distributed in the range [v, v] . Also, we use the parameter values c = 0, v = 1, v = 6 and n = 10.
In the symmetric NE, each primary uses the d.f. φ NE (·) studied in Section IV-B to select its pseudo-price. Fig. 4 shows the function φ NE (·) for the cases when the number of secondaries is a constant, K = 8, and when K takes values in {0, 1, . . . , 16} uniformly at random. Note that the mean number of secondaries E(K) = 8 for both cases, and the other parameters are also the same. The figure shows that primaries randomize over a larger range of prices when the variance in the number of secondaries is larger. Intuitively this is because, primaries tend to prefer low prices when the number of secondaries is small since they may not find buyers at high prices and vice versa. So when the variance in the number of secondaries is larger, primaries set very low prices as well as very high prices since they are suitable in the event that the number of secondaries is small or high respectively.
For the case in which the number of secondaries is a constant, K = k, Fig. 5 plots the mean price of bandwidth charged under the symmetric NE by a primary who has unused bandwidth versus k for different values of q. The figure shows that for each value of q, the mean price is increasing in k. This is because, as k increases, the demand for bandwidth increases and hence the primaries are able to find buyers for their bandwidth even when they set high prices. Fig. 6 shows the mean price versus q for a constant and for a uniformly distributed number of secondaries. In both cases, the mean price is decreasing in q. This is because, as q increases, the expected supply of bandwidth in the market increases and the price competition becomes more intense driving down the prices. Now, note that secondary access of spectrum has been envisioned for enhancing the utilization of the licensed bands and providing spectrum access to users who need it (secondaries). We now investigate the impact the NE pricing strategy has on the above attributes of the system vis a vis that of some other intuitively appealing heuristic pricing strategies. We consider the following heuristic pricing strategies: (a) each primary ignores competition from the other primaries and sets the optimal monopoly price 14 , i.e., the price that would have maximized its expected payoff had it been the only primary in the region (b) each primary, in order to compete with the other primaries, offers a random discount and sets its price uniformly at random (independently of the other primaries) between c and the optimal monopoly price. We denote the pricing strategies in (a) and (b) by MP and RD respectively. Also, let TD be the traditional, i.e., non-CRN, case in which a primary who has unused bandwidth does not lease it out. The attributes under consideration will depend on the scheme actually used to match the primaries with the secondaries. We consider the matching schemes that respectively minimize and maximize the number of primaries whose bandwidth is sold. Recall from Lemma 9 that the scheme W constitutes the first. It also turns out that the scheme B introduced in Section IV-A 14 It can be checked that the optimal monopoly price is the maximizer of the function g(·) defined in (3). constitutes the second 15 . Figs. 7 and 8 plot 16 the spectrum utilization, i.e. the average number of channels (out of n) that are used either by a primary or secondary, for the strategies NE, MP, RD and TD described above when the primarysecondary matching schemes W and B are used respectively. Also, Figs. 9 and 10 plot the fraction of secondaries who get bandwidth, which is proportional to the average per-secondary throughput, for the strategies 17 NE, MP and RD under the schemes W and B respectively. Figs. 7 and 9 show that under the matching scheme W , the spectrum utilization as well as the fraction of secondaries who get bandwidth are significantly higher for the strategy NE than for the other strategies, except for low values of q, for which the strategy RD performs slightly better than NE. Also, Figs. 8 and 10 show that under the matching scheme B, the strategy NE significantly outperforms MP, but is similar in performance 15 To prove this, suppose under scheme B, the bandwidths of the primaries with pseudo-prices p (1) , . . . , p (m) are sold to the secondaries with valuations v (1) , . . . ,ṽ (m) respectively, whereṽ (1) ≤ . . . ≤ṽ (m) , and the bandwidths of the other primaries remain unsold. Now we show that the bandwidths of the maximum number of primaries are sold under B. If not, there must exist a scheme O ∈ A that allows the sale of the bandwidths of the maximum number of primaries, and an integer j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m − 1} such that under O, the primaries with pseudo-prices p (1) , . . . , p (j) are matched with the secondaries with valuationsṽ (1) , . . . ,ṽ (j) respectively, and the primary with pseudo-price p (j+1) is matched with a secondary whose valuation is vs >ṽ (j+1) . One of the following two cases must hold: Case (i): Under O, no primary sells to the secondary with valuationṽ (j+1) . In this case, we can construct a scheme O j+1 which differs from O only in that the primary with pseudo-price p (j+1) is matched with the secondary with valuationṽ (j+1) .
Case (ii):
Under O, a primary with pseudo-price p (l) , where p (l) ≥ p (j+1) , sells to the secondary with valuationṽ (j+1) , where p (l) ≤ṽ (j+1) . Note that v (j+1) ≥ p (l) ≥ p (j+1) and vs >ṽ (j+1) ≥ p (l) . Thus, we can construct another scheme O j+1 which differs from O only in that the primary with pseudo-price p (j+1) (respectively, p (l) ) is matched with the secondary with valuationṽ (j+1) (respectively, vs).
In both cases, (i) O j+1 matches the primaries with pseudo-prices p (1) , . . . , p (j+1) with the secondaries with valuationsṽ (1) , . . . ,ṽ (j+1) and (ii) an equal number of primaries sell their bandwidth under O and O j+1 . Similar to the construction of O j+1 , we construct a sequence of schemes O j+2 , . . . , Om = B, and observe that B sells the bandwidths of the same number of primaries as O. The result follows. 16 Each point in Figs. 7, 8, 9 and 10 is the average of 10000 runs. 17 Note that the fraction of secondaries who get bandwidth is 0 for the strategy TD. The figure plots the spectrum utilization versus q for different strategies when the primary-secondary matching scheme W is used. K takes values in {0, 1, . . . , 16} uniformly at random. The figure plots the spectrum utilization versus q for different strategies when the primary-secondary matching scheme B is used. K takes values in {0, 1, . . . , 16} uniformly at random. to RD 18 . The above numerical computations reveal that even when the primaries choose their actions with the sole goal of maximizing their individual profits, the spectrum utilization and average per-secondary throughput are either significantly better or at least largely comparable to those attained by the above heuristics.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We studied price competition among primary users in a CRN, taking into account uncertainty in the availability of bandwidth with the primaries, randomness in the number of secondaries and randomness in the valuations of secondaries for unit bandwidth. We explicitly computed the symmetric NE and showed its uniqueness. The analysis yields several insights-for example, it shows that randomness in the valuations of secondaries may introduce non-contiguity in the price distributions used by the primaries.
In this paper, we assumed that each primary owns one channel, which corresponds to one unit of bandwidth, the 18 Intuitively, the performance of schemes NE and RD ought to be comparable (especially under scheme B), with the performance of both being significantly better than that of MP. This is because under both NE and RD, primaries offer randomly discounted prices, thus attracting more secondaries than under MP, in which primaries set a high price and do not provide any discounts. leasing costs of different primaries are the same (equal to c) and each secondary is seeking to buy one channel. The scenarios in which (i) different primaries may own multiple and different numbers of channels, (ii) different secondaries are seeking to buy different numbers of channels and (iii) the bandwidths of different channels and the leasing costs of different primaries are not identical, constitute interesting directions for future research. Also, in this paper, we have assumed that primaries do not know the matching scheme that will be used, and hence, to maximize their worst-case payoff, select their pricing strategies assuming that the worstcase scheme W will be used. Determining the symmetric NE pricing strategies for the scenario in which primaries know in advance that a particular matching scheme will be used, is an interesting problem for future research. We have also considered price competition in one time slot; finding the equilibria in the case of repeated interactions remains open. If even in the repeated interactions case, the price selection strategies turn out to be of mixed-type and non-contiguous, the prices selected may widely vary as a function of time. to b − a) across successive slots. The regulator may need to mitigate such price fluctuations through controls such as price limits, which have been investigated in the context of other markets (e.g., see [25] ). Designing frameworks for such regulatory interventions constitute interesting directions for future research.
